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Abstract—Deep learning or deep neural networks (DNNs)
have nowadays enabled high performance, including but not
limited to fraud detection, recommendations, and different kinds
of analytical transactions. However, the large model size, high
computational cost, and vulnerability against membership in-
ference attack (MIA) have impeded its popularity, especially
on resource-constrained edge devices. As the first attempt to
simultaneously address these challenges, we envision that DNN
model compression technique will help deep learning models
against MIA while reducing model storage and computational
cost. We jointly formulate model compression and MIA as
MCMIA, and provide an analytic method of solving the problem.
We evaluate our method on LeNet-5, VGG16, MobileNetV2,
ResNet18 on different datasets including MNIST, CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100, and ImageNet. Experimental results show that our
MCMIA model can reduce the attack accuracy, therefore reduce
the information leakage from MIA. Our proposed method signif-
icantly outperforms differential privacy (DP) on MIA. Compared
with our MCMIA–Pruning, our MCMIA–Pruning & Min-Max
game can achieve the lowest attack accuracy, therefore maximally
enhance DNN model privacy. Thanks to the hardware-friendly
characteristic of model compression, our proposed MCMIA is
especially useful in deploying DNNs on resource-constrained
platforms in a privacy-preserving manner.
Index Terms—DNN, Membership Inference Attack, Model
Compression, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in Machine Learning (ML) have enabled high
accuracy in classifications, recommendations, and natural lan-
guage processing, etc [1]–[3]. The success of modern DNNs
is mainly dependent on the availability of advanced com-
puting power and large amount data [1]. Machine-Learning-
As-A-Service (MLaaS) [4] providers such as Amazon [5],
Microsoft [6], IBM [7], and Google [8] have taken advantage
of the aforementioned two availabilities. By providing black-
box interfaces, MLaaS allows individuals or groups to easily
upload data, leverage powerful large-scale DNNs, and deploy
analytic services via pay-as-you-go or subscription using per-
sonal computers or edge devices [9].
However, there are two main challenges. (i) MLaaS raises
safety and privacy concerns on sensitive data such as patient
treatment records. Even though the DNN model structures
are in black-box, MLaaS can leak sensitive information about
training data used to build back-end models [10]. For instance,
membership inference attack (MIA) [10] is one of the critical
inference attacks in exploiting the aforementioned vulnera-
bility. By using MIA, the adversary monitors the distinctive
behavior of back-end models by repeating sophisticated de-
signed inference requests to further exploit information about
the training data. (ii) DNN models are evolving fast in order
to satisfy the diverse characteristics of broad applications. As
the layers of DNNs get deeper and model size of DNNs
gets larger (e.g., ResNet-152 [2] with 152 layers and 11.3
billion FLOPs), the high computation and large model size
introduce substantial data movements, limiting their ability
to provide a user-friendly experience on resource-constrained
edge devices [1], [2], [11].
To address the MIA challenge, several mechanisms have
been developed. Differential privacy (DP), a major privacy-
preserving mechanism against general Inference attack which
is based on adding noises into gradients or objective function
of training model, has been applied in different machine
learning models [12]–[16]. Although the robustness has been
proven, The utility cost (e.g., creating indistinguishable non-
membership datasets, calculating a bound for the function
sensitivity) of DP is hard to be limited as acceptable since it
imposes a significant accuracy loss for protecting complicated
models as well as on high dimensional data when noise is
large. Another defense mechanism is game theory, e.g., Min-
Max game, which guarantees the information privacy. The
maximum gain of inference model is considered as a a new
regularization called adversarial regularization and will be
minimized with training model loss. Unfortunately, Min-Max
game introduces extra computational costs in addition to the
classifier training process. Finally yet importantly, neither DP
nor Min-Max game addresses the second challenge, i.e., high
computation and large model size in DNNs.
In this work, in order to simultaneously address the two
challenges, we design and implement an innovative MIA
defense method that is optimized for the dual objectives of
privacy and efficiency. We show that an effective DNN model
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compression technique helps against MIA while simultane-
ously achieving model storage and computational complexity
reduction within very small accuracy loss. We present the main
contributions of our work:
• As the first attempt to simultaneously address the chal-
lenges of large model size, high computational cost, and
vulnerability against MIA on DNNS, we jointly formulate
model compression and MIA as MCMIA, and provide an
analytic method of solving the problem.
• We investigate the MCMIA–Pruning to evaluate if model
compression has the same effectiveness as Min-Max
game, i.e., reduce attack accuracy. We provide the at-
tack and testing accuracy of baseline (without defense
and pruning) and MCMIA–Pruning. Experimental results
show that the attack accuracy using pruning is 13.6%, 3%,
3.77%, 9.1%, 3.48%, 2.11%, 5% lower than the attack
accuracy of baseline, for LeNet-5 on MNIST, VGG16
on CIFAR-10, MobileNetV2 on CIFAR-10, VGG16 on
CIFAR-100, MobileNetV2 on CIFAR-100, MobileNetV2
on ImageNet, ResNet18 on ImageNet, respectively.
• We verify that model compression performs better than
Min-Max game, i.e., further reduce attack accuracy. Ex-
perimental results show that the attack accuracy using
pruning is 2.6%, 1.34%, 10% lower than the attack accu-
racy of baseline, for LeNet-5 on MNIST, MobileNetV2
on CIFAR-10, VGG16 on CIFAR-100, respectively.
• We further investigate the combination of model com-
pression and Min-Max game and show that the com-
bination will maximally enhance DNN model privacy,
and formulate it as the MCMIA–Pruning & Min-Max.
Experimental results show that MCMIA–Pruning & Min-
Max achieves 3.03% and 1% further lower than MCMIA–
Pruning only, for CIFAR100 on VGG16, and LeNet-5 for
MNIST, respectively.
Experimental results show that our MCMIA model can re-
duce the information leakage from MIA. Our proposed method
significantly outperforms DP on MIA. Thanks to the hardware-
friendly characteristic of model compression, our proposed
MCMIA is especially useful in deploying DNNs on resource-
constrained platforms in a privacy-preserving manner.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
A. DNN Model Compression (MC)
State-of-the-art (SOTA) DNNs contain multiple cascaded
layers, and at least millions of parameters (i.e., weights) for
the entire model [1]–[3], [17], [18]. The large model size and
computational cost limit their ability to provide a user-friendly
experience, especially on resource-constrained platforms [1],
[11]. To address the challenges, prior works have focused
on developing DNN model compression algorithms such as
weight pruning [19]–[23] (i.e., removing weights with specific
dimensions or with any desired weight matrix shapes) utilizing
different regularization techniques to explore sparsity. The key
idea is to keep the critical weights and develop optimization
techniques to regularize the loss function to maintain model
accuracy, to represent a neural network with a much simpler
model. On the other hand, a simpler model brings accelera-
tion in computation and reduction in weight storage, hence
achieving fast training and inference speed.
ADMM-based DNN Model Compression: Recent works [22],
[24] have shown by incorporating alternating direction method
of multipliers (ADMM) into DNN model compression, one
can achieve high weight reduction ratio while maintaining
the accuracy. Considering an optimization problem minx f(x)
with combinatorial constraints, which is difficult to solve di-
rectly using optimization tools [22]. By using ADMM [25], the
minx f(x) problem can be decomposed into two subproblems
on x and z (auxiliary variable), i.e., the first subproblem
derives x given z: minx f(x) + q1(x|z); the second subprob-
lem derives z given x: minz I(z) + q2(z|x). Both q1 and q2
are quadratic functions. In such way, the two subproblems
could be solved separately and iteratively until convergence.
Originally, ADMM is used to accelerate the convergence of
convex optimization problems and enable distributed optimiza-
tion, where the optimality and fast convergence rate have been
proven [25], [26]. One special property of ADMM is that it can
effectively deal with a subset of combinatorial constraints and
yields optimal (or at least high quality) solutions [27], [28].
The related constraints in DNN model compression belong to
this subset of combinatorial constraints, therefore ADMM is
applicable to DNN mode compression. Consider the i-th layer
in an N -layer DNN (containing both convolutional and fully
connected layers), the weights and bias can be represented by
Wi and bi. The overall DNN model compression problem
is given by: min{Wi},{bi}f
({Wi}Ni=1, {bi}Ni=1), subject to
Wi ∈ Si, i = 1, . . . , N , where f(·) is the loss func-
tion of DNN model, Si = {Wi|card(Wi) ≤ ni}, and
ni is the specified number of weights in the i-th layer.
According to [22], [25], the problem can be rewritten as
min{Wi},{bi}f
({Wi}Ni=1, {bi}Ni=1)+∑Ni=1 gi(Zi), subject to
Wi = Zi, i = 1, . . . , N , where Zi is an auxiliary variable.
With formation of augmented Lagrangian [25], this problem
can be decomposed into two subproblems.
B. Membership Inference Attack (MIA)
In reality, users are usually unwilling to share data for
privacy concerns. Especially in the medical field, sharing
private patient information is prohibited by law or regulation.
Given an input, the adversary goal in MIA is to determine
whether it belongs to the training dataset [10]. If the attacker
can determine a given input belonging to the training data
correctly, it is an information leakage.
As the first work on using MIA against machine learning
models, Shokri et al. [10] used different neural networks as
attack models that take the prediction from the target model
to determine whether a data record is from the training set
of the target model. Since the target model is a black-box
API, Shokri et al. proposed to construct multiple shadow
models to mimic the target models behavior and derive the data
necessary, i.e., the posteriors and the ground truth membership,
to train attack models. Nasr et al. [29] introduced a privacy
mechanism to train machine learning models such that the
predictions on its training data are indistinguishable from its
predictions on other data points from the same distribution.
Salem et al. [30] adopted one shadow model instead of
multiple ones to duplicate the behavior of the target model.
Detailed experiments including eight datasets covering images
to text were performed on various DNN models to demonstrate
the adversary can achieve similar accuracy as Shokri et al. [10]
with the proposed one shadow and one attack model.
C. Defense mechanism against MIA
One defense direction is using game theory to protecting
privacy [29], [31]–[35]. Most of game theory based mecha-
nisms minimize the privacy loss against the strongest attacker
by converting the utility function into min-max optimization
problem. After Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) being
proposed by [36], some new algorithms for solving min-max
problem while training DNN model. For instance, using a
similar framework as GAN, Nasr et al. [29] proposed a Min-
Max game mechanism and formulated the gain of MIA as
a new regularization, which is maximized while the classifier
prediction’s loss is minimized. We use it as a comparison with
our experimental results.
DP is another major defense mechanism against MIA. There
are multiple DP based defense mechanisms [15], [37], [38], by
adding noises into gradients or objective function of training
model. However, the existing mechanisms would impose a
significant accuracy loss for protecting complicated models as
well as on high dimensional data when the noise parameter
 is large. Differential privacy mechanisms are difficult to
achieve with negligible utility loss, where utility loss is related
to creating same distribution’s state of all input data, and
also computing the gradient noise with a narrow bound.
There are some other defense directions. For example, model
stacking [30] mechanism made a combination of multiple
classifier results to prevent the attacker from inferring a single
target classifier. Dropout [30] mechanism dropped a neuron
from the neural network by fixed probability. MemGuard [39]
mechanism randomly added noise on the target classifier
prediction.
The existing defenses have at least one of the limitations
as following: 1) they have typical extra computations, such as
extra weight storage and noise calculations. That means these
mechanisms introduce extra computational costs in addition
to the training approaches. 2) they achieve privacy protection
with significant utility loss.
III. MCMIA: PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this work, we investigate the following question: Will
an effective DNN model compression technique help against
MIA while simultaneously achieving model storage and com-
putational complexity reduction within very small accuracy
loss? We start with formulating the joint problem of model
compression and MIA.
Classifier
Member Non-
Member
X X’
D (X, Y) D’ (X’, Y’)
f(x) f(x’)
h(x, y, f(x)) h(x’, y’, f(x’))
Model Compression
Adversary
Fig. 1. Illustrative diagram of using model compression against MIA.
We consider the MIA problems in a black-box condition,
which means the adversary can only observe the input and
output of the model with input dataset. Figure 1 shows an
illustrative diagram of using model compression against MIA
in DNNs. We use h to denote the adversarial inference model
h : x× y× l(x) −→ [0, 1]. h takes the feature of data donated
as x, the label of data donated as y, and the prediction of
classification model donated as l(x) as inputs and outputs the
probability of (x, y) belonging to member of the training set
D. We use PrD(X,Y ) to denote the conditional probability
of being a member of D and use PrD′(X,Y ) to denote
non-member examples from non-training set D′. When the
conditional probability is known, we can formulate the gain
function for MIA as follows:
Gf (h) =
1
2
E
(x,y)∼PrD(X,Y )
[
log(h(x, y, f(x)))
]
+
1
2
E
(x,y)∼PrD′ (X,Y )
[
log(1− h(x, y, f(x)))] (1)
A. Problem Formulation
We consider the following MIA assumption: the adversary
has access to obtain a data record and can obtain the prediction
from the black-box DNN target model. Based on the difference
of model prediction’s distribution with membership dataset
and non-membership datasets, the adversary will determine
whether the data record belongs to the model’s membership
dataset or not. Furthermore, the adversary tries to maximize
the accuracy of its determination.
We argue that model compression can be used against
the MIA, by pruning the model weights to build a defense
system, so that the model prediction for membership (training
dataset) and non-training dataset are distinguishable. In this
case, it becomes more difficult for the adversary to determine
where the observed data record belongs to. Finally, the risk
of membership privacy loss is reduced. Ideally the adversary
can only make a determination by random guess. At the same
time, the classification accuracy of the model will not be or
slightly be affected. In other words, the utility cost of defense
(e.g., classification accuracy loss) is negligible.
In our model, we first use ADMM-based model compression
to systematically pruning the DNN weights, under the condi-
tion of maximizing the adversary gain G, then we minimize
the classification loss function as a trade-off between the
privacy and classification accuracy. We initially formalize the
MCMIA problem as
min
{Wi},{bi}
P{Wi}{f({Wi}, {bi}),
Q{Wi}[G[h(l({Wi}, {bi}))]]}
(2)
P{Wi} and Q{Wi} are the model compression projections
to constrain the possibility that adversary can make correct
determination in a certain boundary. For the further step, we
consider the Min-Max game [29] to strengthen our MCMIA–
Pruning, and the corresponding optimize problem would be-
come
min
{Wi},{bi}
P{Wi}{f({Wi}, {bi})
+ γ max
h
Q{Wi}[G[h(l({Wi}, {bi}))]]}
(3)
where γ is a constant, as an adversarial regularization factor.
B. Problem Analysis
By pruning the weight of the training model systematically,
the output distribution can not be distinguished from the
training dataset or none-training dataset. In other words, model
compression reduces the gain of the adversary. Meanwhile, we
have a ”free lunch”, i.e., we can simultaneously achieve model
storage and computational complexity/cost reduction within
very small accuracy loss.
According to [29], the gain of the adversary can be written
as
Gl(h) =
1
2
[ ∫
x,y
PrD(x, y)pl(l(x)) log(h(x, y, l(x)))dxdy
+
∫
x′ ,y′
PrD′(x
′, y′)p′l(l(x
′)) log(1− h(x′, y′, l(x′))dx′dy′]
(4)
x is one data record from D and x′ is data record from
D′. pl and p′l are the probability distribution of the model l’s
output on training data records and not-training data records,
respectively.
To maximize the gain Gl(h), the inference model h reaches
optimal determination solution denoted as h∗l [29], [36]
h∗l (x, y, l(x)) =
pl(l(x))
pl(l(x)) + p′l(l(x))
(5)
Consider an image x from training dataset, the difference
between the inference model’s determination of x is from
training dataset and non-training dataset can be written as
d = |pl(l(x))− p′l(l(x))| (6)
where d is the probability difference between adversary’s bi-
nary determination. Ideally, if a model can be totally protected
from MIA, the inference model can only flip a coin to make
the determination with the possibility of 0.5, which means
pl(l(x)) = p
′
l(l(x)) (7)
In other word, d = 0.
In the proposed MCMIA: Min-Max game, given the best
strategy of adversary against any classifier, we design the
model compression mechanism as the best response to MIA.
After using model compression on the classification model,
the corresponding constrains inference model determination
becomes:
h∗l(mc)(x, y, lmc(x)) =
plmc(lmc(x))
plmc(lmc(x)) + p
′
lmc
(lmc(x))
(8)
where lmc is corresponding to the classification model l with
model compression. The gap between prediction distribution
of training/not-training dataset is:
dmc = |plmc(lmc(x))− p′lmc(lmc(x))| (9)
By systematically pruning the weight in k steps [22], the
distribution of lmc(x) and l(x) will be ’nearly identical’. dmc
become smaller. Finally, we can obtain an ’near-perfect’ dmc
to against the inference model. And it is equivalent with h∗l(mc)
close to 0.5. In this case, the optimal inference model can
only flip a coin to guess if the data record is from training
dataset. The MCMIA can successfully prevent the leakage of
the training data information.
Considering about the classification loss, we minimize the
classification loss f(·) while constraining Gl(h∗l(mc)) , which
is min
l
(fl + γG(h
∗
l(mc))). Based on [29], [36], it constrains
Gl(h
∗
l(mc)) and minimizes the classification loss.
To summarize, our model is an MC-conditional classifi-
cation under minimum classification loss. It can completely
constrain the gain of MIA, which means the adversary can
not distinguish the training data record and non-training record
from the model’s input data.
IV. MCMIA: METHODOLOGY
A. Unified Problem Reformulation of MCMIA
The total loss of MCMIA can be formulated as
f
({Wi}, {bi}) = Lcross(Wi,bi)
+ γG(h({Wi}, {bi}))
(10)
where Lcross is the cross-entropy loss, G is the gain function
of the MIA, γ, as a constant, is the coefficient value of the
gain function. More specifically, the gain function is
G(h({Wi}, {bi}))
=
1
2
E[log(h(x,y,Wix + bi))]
+
1
2
E[log(1− h(x,y, {Wix + bi}))]
(11)
We use Augmented Lagrangian method to solve the Min-
Max game and we write the Lagrangian format [22] of Eq. 10
as
Lλ
({Wi}, {bi}, {Zi}, {Λi})
= f
({Wi}, {bi})+ N∑
i=1
Ii(Zi) +
N∑
i=1
tr[ΛTi (Wi − Zi)]
+ λG({W1 − Z1}, ..., {WN − ZN}),
subject to: Wi = Zi, i = 1, . . . ,N.
(12)
We define Ui = (1/λ)Λi, so that the Lagrangian format
above can be rewritten as,
Lλ
({Wi}, {bi}, {Zi}, {Λi})
= Lcross(Wi,bi) +
N∑
i=1
Ii(Zi) + γG(h({Wi}, {bi}))
+ λG({Wi − Zi + Ui}, {bi})− λG({Ui})
(13)
We summarize MCMIA problem as the following
argmin
Wi∈Si
G(h({Wi}, {bi})),
min
{Wi},{bi}
Lλ
({Wi}, {bi}, {Zi}, {Λi}) (14)
B. Solution Strategy
In our algorithm, we systematically solve the reformulated
problem by satisfying the following constraints,
‖G({Wk+1i − Zk+1i }, {bk+1i })− log(
1
2
)‖ ≤ i (15)
and
‖G({Zk+1i − Zki }, {bk+1i })− log(
1
2
)‖ ≤ i (16)
The Augmented Lagrangian format can be decomposed into
solving the following problems and the parameters are updated
repeatedly as follows
{Wk+1i ,bk+1i } := argmin
{Wi},{bi}
Lλ
({Wi}, {bi}, {Zki }, {Uki })
{Zk+1i } := argmin
{Zi}
Lλ
({Wk+1i }, {bk+1i }, {Zi}, {Uki })
Uk+1i := U
k
i + W
k+1
i − Zk+1i ,
(17)
The sub-problem of optimization Zi can be written as
min
{Zi}
N∑
i=1
gi(Zi) +
N∑
i=1
γG(h({Wi}, {bi})) (18)
Since gi(·) is the indicator function of the set Si, the globally
optimal solution of the problem can be explicitly derived as
[22]:
{Zk+1i } = ΠSi(Wk+1i + Uki ) (19)
where ΠSi denotes the Euclidean projection onto the set Si.
Algorithm 1 The Process of MCMIA
1: for epoch in epochs do
2: for t in iterations do
3: Get a random mini-batch S ⊂ D.
4: Get a random mini-batch S′ ⊂ D′.
5: Update {Wt}, {bt} in h using SDG.
6: end for
7: Get a different random mini-batch S′′ ⊂ D, S′′ 6= S.
8: Update {Wt}, {bt} in l using ADMM.
9: end for
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY AND MEMBERSHIP ATTACK
ACCURACY ON CIFAR-10 AND MNIST BETWEEN DP AND MCMIA.
DP MCMIA
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
CIFAR-10-
CNN 68.10% 58.30% 75.46% 57.36%
MNIST-
LeNet-5 96.64% 78.54% 99.30% 53.41%
V. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
To evaluate our proposed method, we apply MCMIA on
different DNN models including LeNet-5 [40], VGG16 [41],
MobileNetV2 [42], ResNet18 [2] on different datasets (e.g.,
MNIST [43], CIFAR-10 [44], CIFAR-100 [44], ImageNet [1]).
We use LeNet-5 on MNIST dataset. On CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 dataset, we use VGG-16, MobileNetV2 and
ResNet18 models to evaluate the prediction accuracy. We also
use MobileNetV2 and ResNet18 models on ImageNet dataset
to show the scalability of our proposed method. LeNet-5 is a
classical convolution neural network with one input layer, two
convolution layers with kernel size 5x5 and 2x2 respectively,
followed by an average pooling layer, two fully-connected
layers and one output layer. VGG-16 is a standard convolution
neural network with 13 convolutional layers of kernel size 3x3
followed by 2 fully-connected layers and 1 softmax output
layer. MobileNetV2 is a convolution neural network contains
the initial fully convolution layer with 32 filters, followed by
19 residual bottleneck layers. ResNet18 is a standard residual
network, consisting of 8 residual convolution blocks followed
by an average pooling layer of size 7x7 and a fully-connected
layer.
For comparison with Min-Max game, we use Min-Max
game in the experimental setup above, since it is robust to
different attacks meanwhile has limited accuracy loss of the
targeted model. We also include a brief comparison between
DP and MCMIA on CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets.
For comparison with DP, in CIFAR-10 dataset, We followed
the same architecture with the four layer(two convolution
layers and 2 fully connected layers) CNN classification model
in [16] and compare our results with the reported results in
[16]. For MNIST datasets, we use LeNet-5 as the classification
model and implement DP which reaches the optimal solution
with the noise parameter  as 6.28.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY AND MEMBERSHIP ATTACK
ACCURACY ON DIFFERENT IMAGE DATASETS BETWEEN MODEL BASELINE,
MCMIA AND MIN-MAX GAME.
Baseline MCMIA–Pruning Min-Max Game
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
Accuracy
MNIST-
LeNet-5 99.3% 67.00% 99.39% 53.41% 98.98% 56.00%
CIFAR-10-
VGG16 91.28% 61.99% 91.38% 59.02% 90.97% 60.35%
CIFAR-10-
MobileNetV2 90.09% 62.75% 86.14% 58.98% 89.71% 57.91%
CIFAR-100-
VGG16 64.84% 67.628% 66.93% 58.61% 65.71% 68.59%
CIFAR-100-
MobileNetV2 64.14% 66.15% 57.72% 62.67% 63.36% 62.61%
CIFAR-100-
ResNet18 73.45% 69.85% 74.07% 74.31% 69.05% 71.78%
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY AND MEMBERSHIP ATTACK
ACCURACY ON IMAGENET BETWEEN MODEL BASELINE AND MCMIA.
Baseline MCMIA
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
ImageNet-
MobileNetV2 71.88% 66.90% 68.77% 64.79%
ImageNet-
ResNet18 69.76% 66.20% 69.30% 61.27%
The MCMIA training process is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code that the ADMM model
compression work on training classifier l against the MIA
model h. For every epoch, out of the iterations step, ADMM
model compression systematically prunes the weight of up-
dating classifier follow the solution strategy. In the iterations
step, for a fixed training classifier, the MIA model is trained
to distinguish the prediction of the classifier from training and
non-training datasets. Inner iterations steps, the MIA model
is trained to distinguish the classifier l’s prediction of inputs
from training dataset D and non-training dataset D′.
B. Inference Attack Model
In order to compare with Min-Max game, we use the same
neural network as the inference attack model as in [29] for all
experiments except CIFAR-10-CNN in Table I. The inference
attack model is composed of three fully-connected sub neural
networks in a hierarchical structure. The prediction vector l(x)
and the targeted label y are fed into two sub-networks in the
first level in parallel, and the processed representations of the
two sub-networks are then concatenated and fed into the third
sub-network on the second level to make the final prediction.
The architectures of the two sub-networks for processing l(x)
and y are [100, 1024, 512, 64] and [100, 512, 64] respectively.
The architecture of the third sub-network is [256, 64, 1]. We
use ReLu as the activation function for the whole network. The
weights are initialized following N (0, 0.01). We use Adam
optimizer with learning rate 0.001. For CIFAR-10-CNN in
Table I, the inference attack model consists of one fully-
connected layer, the same as in [16].
C. Evaluation Results on MCMIA–Pruning
1) MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100: We compare model
compression (using MCMIA–Pruning) and Min-Max game to
TABLE IV
ACCURACY OF MCMIA–PRUNING AND MCMIA–PRUNING & MIN-MAX.
MCMIA–Pruning MCMIA–Pruing & Min-Max
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
CIFAR-10-VGG16 91.38% 59.02% 89.19% 55.93%
CIFAR-100-VGG16 66.93% 58.61% 54.71% 57.65%
MNIST-LeNet-5 99.39% 53.41% 99.03% 54.00%
investigate if model compression can constrain the maximum
gain G of the inference model, i.e, further reduce attack accu-
racy. We provide the attack accuracy and testing accuracy of
baseline (without defense and pruning), MCMIA–Pruning, and
Min-Max game as shown in Table II. On MNIST, experimental
results demonstrate that for LeNet-5, the attack accuracy using
MCMIA–Pruning is 13.6% lower than the attack accuracy of
baseline, and is 2.6% lower than the attack accuracy of Min-
Max game. From the comparison between DP and MCMIA
shown in Table I, MCMIA achieves 25.13% lower attack
accuracy than DP and with 2.66% higher testing accuracy of
the classification model.
On CIFAR-10, with experimental results demonstrate that
for VGG16, the attack accuracy using MCMIA–Pruning is 3%
lower than the baseline attack accuracy and is 1.34% lower
than the attack accuracy of Min-Max game. On the other
hand, for MobileNetV2, the attack accuracy using MCMIA–
Pruning is 3.77% lower than the baseline attack accuracy,
and is close to Min-Max game. As shown in Table I, on a
4 layer CNN [16], MCMIA has 1% lower attack accuracy
with DP, while MCMIA has 7.36% higher testing accuracy
of the classification model than DP. On CIFAR-100, with
the experimental results demonstrate that for VGG16, the
attack accuracy using MCMIA–Pruning is 9.1% lower than the
baseline attack accuracy, and is approximately 10% lower than
the Min-Max game. On the other hand, for MobileNetV2, the
attack accuracy using MCMIA–Pruning is 3.48% lower than
the baseline attack accuracy and is close to Min-Max game.
The results indicate that using model compression can help
against MIA and model compression is more effective than
using Min-Max game. On the other hand, model compression
have significantly less utility cost then DP. And our experiment
also shows that DP is hard to achieve privacy-preserving with
negligible utility loss. Also base on the experiment in [16],
to achieve the same level of attack accuracy, the test accuracy
under the DP method is under 70% in the best case, 25% in
the worst case on CIFAR-10 by different noise parameter .
In addition, model compression brings another benefit shown
in Table V, i.e., we achieve 15.78X model size reduction for
LeNet-5 on MNIST, at least 10.06X model size reduction for
on CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100 among VGG16, MobileNetV2, and
ResNet18, which is extremely helpful for deploying DNNs
on resource-constrained edge devices. Figure 3 (a)-(c) show
the weight distributions in different classification models from
baseline, MCMIA, and Min-Max game. We can observe that
after pruning, the weights are much less than the baseline
model and Min-Max game model (both without pruning).
Next, we investigate classification loss of baseline (without
pruning and defense), MCMIA–Pruning, and Min-Max Game.
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Fig. 2. Upper row: the classification loss along with epochs during training classification model. Lower row: membership attack accuracy during training
inference model based on the trained classification model. Classification models baseline, MCMIA and Min-Max game are shown in (a-c) respectively.
(a) Baseline (b) MCMIA-Pruning
(c) Min-Max Defense (d) MCMIA-Pruning & Min-Max
Fig. 3. Distribution of weights in VGG16 trained on CIFAR-10 from (a)
baseline, (b) MCMIA, (c) Min-Max Game, and (d) MCMIA–Pruning & Min-
Max.
Taking CIFAR-10-VGG16 as an example, Figure 2 shows the
classification loss of baseline, MCMIA–Pruning and Min-Max
Game respectively in the upper row. The classification loss of
MCMIA converges rapidly in less than 20 epochs. In addition,
it has the highest final classification loss when the model is
fully trained. In other words, MCMIA prevents overfitting
instead of reducing the classification loss on training data
arbitrary low. We train the membership inference model based
on the predicted outputs of the well-trained classification
model. We plot the testing accuracy of membership inference
attack during the inference model training process in the
lower row in Figure 2. The adversary attack accuracy is
measured by the average of adversary’s correct determination
percentage among all adversary determination for the observed
data records [29].
TABLE V
MODEL COMPRESSION RATIOS IN DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION
NETWORKS.
Data Model Weights (#) Weights afterprunning (#)
Weights
reduction ratio
MNIST LeNet 60 K 3.80 K 15.78 X
CIFAR-10/100
VGG16 13.83 M 1.08 M 12.8 X
ResNet18 11.17 M 1.06 M 10.54 X
MobileNetV2 3.46 M 0.34 M 10.06 X
ImageNet ResNet18 11.17 M 3.47 M 3.37 XMobileNetV2 3.46 M 1.06 M 3.27 X
2) ImageNet: The experimental results for ImageNet are
shown in Table III, which demonstrate that for MobileNetV2,
the attack accuracy using MCMIA–Pruning is 2.11% lower
than the baseline, then, for ResNet18, the attack accuracy
using pruning is approximately 5% lower than the baseline.
The weight reduction ratio is 3.37X for ResNet18 and 3.27X
for MobileNetV2 compare with the baseline weights.
D. Evaluation Results on MCMIA–Pruning & Min-Max
The experimental result for the MCMIA–Pruning & Min-
Max is showed in Table IV. The experiment results demon-
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON TRAINING AND TESTING
SET AND MEMBERSHIP ATTACK ACCURACY BETWEEN MODEL BASELINE,
MCMIA–PRUNING, MIN-MAX GAME AND
MCMIA–PRUNING&MIN-MAX.
Training
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Baseline 99.66% 91.28% 61.99%
MCMIA–Pruning 99.22% 91.38% 59.02%
Min-Max Game 99.18% 90.97% 60.35%
MCMIA–Pruning&Min-Max 92.86% 89.19% 55.93%
strate that for CIFAR-10-VGG16, the attack accuracy of
Pruning &Min-Max is 55.93%, which is 3.03% lower than
the attack accuracy of MCMIA–Pruning. And for CIFAR-100-
VGG16, the attack accuracy of pruning & Min-Max is 57.65%,
which is 1% lower than the attack accuracy of MCMIA–
Pruning. For MNIST-LeNet-5, the attack accuracy of pruning
& Min-Max is close to the attack accuracy of MCMIA–
Pruning. Figure 3 (d) shows the distribution of weights in
classification models from MCMIA–Pruning & Min-Max. We
can also observe that after pruning, the weights are much less
than the baseline model.
E. MCMIA Analysis
In general, for the same type of model, the more over-
fitting the model is, the more vulnerable it is to MIA. The
least generic the distribution of training data is, the more
information it leaks. MCMIA achieves parameter sparsity by
pruning non-critical weights, thus can potentially reduce the
overfitting caused by over parameterization. Taking CIFAR-
10-VGG16 as an example, we compare the prediction on
training data and non-training data among baseline, MCMIA–
Pruning and Min-Max Game, showing in Figure 4. Baseline
has high probability for its correct class in the training data,
while predicts less high probability in the testing data. Such
difference makes it vulnerable to MIA. However, MCMIA–
Pruning and Min-Max Game have relatively similar predicted
probability between training and testing data. To summarize
the difference of prediction between training and non-training
data quantitatively, we plot the MIA accuracy along with the
difference of classification accuracy between training and non-
training data for each class in CIFAR-10 in Figure 5. We name
such difference as training/non-training accuracy gap. Shown
in Figure 5, there is a trend that the larger the training-non-
training accuracy gap is, the higher the membership attack
accuracy is. Among all the four methods, MCMIA–Pruning
& Min-Max achieves the lowest train-test accuracy gap and
lowest membership inference attack accuracy, therefore pro-
viding the highest privacy enhancement. The comparison of
overall training accuracy, testing accuracy, and membership
inference attack accuracy is illustrated in Table VI, which
conveys similar messages as Figure 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we jointly formulate model compression
and MIA as MCMIA, and provide an analytic method of
solving the problem. We evaluate our method on LeNet-
5, VGG16, MobileNetV2, ResNet18 on different datasets
including MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet.
From experimental results, we see model compression can
significantly reduce the information leakage from MIA. Our
proposed method outperforms DP on MIA. Compared with our
MCMIA–Pruning, our MCMIA–Pruning & Min-Max game
can achieve the lowest attack accuracy, therefore maximally
enhance DNN model privacy. Thanks to the hardware-friendly
characteristic of model compression (reducing weight storage
and computational cost), our proposed MCMIA is very helpful
for deploying DNNs on resource-constrained edge devices.
We hope our proposed method will shed some light on the
increasing membership privacy concerns when applying DNNs
on user-sensitive data such as business and medical datasets,
in the era of edge computing.
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